The current conversation on mission command among some professional circles is on the brink of becoming unhealthy, even dangerous to the military profession as a whole. A chapter from the recently published anthology Mission Command: The Who, What, Where, When, and Why serves as an example of recent dialogue on the topic that possesses the potential to do more harm than good.
Understanding cognitive psychology provides insights on phenomena such as the 'directed course of action.' Cognitive psychologist Gary Klein's book, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions, describes what he calls recognition-primed decision-making, offering an explanation and insights into how tactical leaders think and develop approaches to solve problems on the battlefield.
Guest writer Brad Wellsandt joins us again, arguing that at the battalion/brigade level, intelligence officers must clearly understand their role. The S2 must take on the mindset of a fighter, one who fights the enemy, fights for information, and fights to get knowledge to his Commander. Additionally, they must integrate intelligence into the planning process and during execution through the development and use of priority intelligence requirements. Assuming these roles will allow intelligence officers and, as a result, their Commanders better understand the enemy.
Crucial to tactical decision-making is the commander’s consideration of the environment, his own forces, and the enemy’s forces. Tactical leaders think at three levels and how they visualize the actions of friendly and enemy forces significantly impacts the quality of their decision-making.
Communities of practice such as the Irwin Drink and Think are developing and growing across the US Army. The experience that members of The Tactical Leader gained in establishing a group and coming together for three years might prove valuable to anyone seeking to start a similar type of community of practice. In particular, three insights lead us to believe that the success that we enjoyed meets a currently existing demand, is easily replicable, and yields meaningful results - the very definition of innovation.
Preparing and training formations almost exclusively in the conduct of passive, stealthy reconnaissance leaves the formation out-of-balance in respect to its capabilities. The ability to conduct aggressive reconnaissance is an essential proficiency in large-scale combat operations. Formations must train both. This post seeks to highlights considerations in favor of conducting aggressive reconnaissance that a tactical leader should use to inform thier model of reconnaissance.
Guest CPT Brad Wellsandt argues that US Army Soldiers and leaders operating within the intelligence warfighting function find themselves amid a crisis of relevance at the tactical level. Often ineffective at informing the BCT Commander's decision-making and increasingly marginalized, he recommends better integration with other warfighting functions, changing the culture surrounding intelligence at the tactical level, and reforming training.
Tactical commanders and staffs today struggle to attack the enemy's weaknesses while leveraging their formation's inherent strengths. To better maneuver at the tactical level, we must first overcome two hurdles that currently challenge our commanders and staffs.
The tactical commander and his staff seek to plan and execute a course of action that best exploits the enemy's weaknesses. Understanding the reconnaissance techniques, pull and push, and how they contribute to the formation's ability to identify and attack from a position of relative advantage is essential to tactical success.
To grow and develop as a tactical leader, it is essential to understand your own strengths and weaknesses. Tactical leaders might benefit greatly if they took the time to consider their competencies through the lens of the Adult Learning Model.
Maintaining flexibility in tactical planning and operations requires understanding of the linkages between analysis of the enemy, reconnaissance, and decision points.
In our efforts to conduct reconnaissance, we find ourselves falling well short of achieving the reconnaissance objective. We must leverage the Cavalry formation’s capability to conduct combined-arms maneuver to overcome this challenge.
We should not approach mission command and directive command with an either/ or mindset. Operations often require directive command and control in order to achieve the overwhelming effects on the enemy necessary to accomplish the mission.
To win in combat, we must master the science of warfighting. We cannot accept anything less of ourselves and our tactical leaders.
